Report Finds Iran Halted Nuclear Programme in 2003, Throws U.S. Strategy into Disarray
After months spent trying to build international consensus to support tough action over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme, the U.S. administration has been wrong-footed by a report from its own intelligence agencies.

Surprise Assessment

There was widespread surprise, even consternation, yesterday when the United States released its latest National Intelligence Assessment of Iran's alleged nuclear programme. The report concludes that despite the country's more hardline political shift and bellicose rhetoric, it actually halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003. This effectively contradicts the assessment made in 2005, not to mention repeated assertions by the U.S. administration that the programme is ongoing. The conclusions cannot be dismissed lightly—they represent the consensus view of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies—and the authors must presumably have been in possession of strong evidence before making such a provocative assessment. There is speculation that the shift may have been prompted by the testimony of former Iranian deputy defence minister General Ali Asghari, who defected to the West at the start of the year. The agencies were intending to release their assessment in spring 2007, but decided to delay publication. Iran itself has repeatedly denied it is developing nuclear weapons—as have other countries, such as Russia—but the assessment does, nonetheless, warn that the agencies do not know whether the Islamic Republic "currently intends to develop nuclear weapons". Its uranium enrichment programme for nuclear power stations could moreover provide the raw materials for a reactivated weapons programme come the middle of the next decade. The report is very much in line with recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) findings on this front.

These elements of the assessment do provide some justification to those who argue that a firm international position is necessary to prevent such an outcome, but the estimate suggests the dangers are less imminent than previously assumed. The assessment argues that the cessation of the military-run nuclear weapons programme in 2003 was "primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure", a comment that will be seized on by those who argue that international pressure does not need to be escalated. However, the report undercuts assumptions that the Iranian government is acting irrationally without gauging the risks such a programme would entail: “decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs”.

The assessment will inevitably be read in the context of what went on in the build-up to the Iraq war, with which there are striking parallels. Again, the administration based its tough policies on the assumption that the Iraqi government was amassing weapons of mass destruction. They found justification in national intelligence estimates (particularly that made in 2002), and the strategy culminated in the 2003 invasion. It was subsequently discovered that no such weapons existed, and there was fierce criticism of the intelligence failings. Critics of the administration argued that the intelligence community was pressed to support the administration's position despite flimsy evidence. Whether or not this was the case, the debacle has undoubtedly made the agencies more cautious and wary of accusations of political bias. Fresh evidence may have been the main reason for the shift in analysis, but one would expect the agencies to stand up to the administration more readily given the Iraq context.

Administration Wrong-Footed

The implications of the report for U.S. domestic politics will be very interesting to watch. They are undoubtedly a major setback for an administration that seemed to be gearing up for a final year dominated by Iran, but they also reshape the debate among the presidential hopefuls in both parties. On the Democrat side, a number of the candidates (including Senator Hillary Clinton) have been echoing the administration position and calling for tough action on Iran. Stung by Republican accusations that they are weak on national security, they have been keen to show that where there is justification for such policies they are unafraid to take this course. Now that these justifications are being eroded, one can expect positions to soften rapidly. For the Republican candidates, too, there are now dilemmas. They have unsurprisingly competed over their anti-Iran rhetoric, and it will be interesting to see whether they now decide to push this down their respective agendas. They can, of course, seize on the uncertainty over Iran's intentions, and on the assessment that the programme only ceased in 2003 in reaction to tough international pressure. The administration's reaction to the assessment has so far been rather muted, but it has stressed that its concerns over Iran persist. Whether Bush feels able to repeat proclamations heard in October that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead to "World III" remains to be seen. Whether the administration already knew about the change in the intelligence estimates at the time that such assertions were being made is uncertain. All-in-all, it seems Iran will have to slip down the agenda in 2008, upsetting assumptions about the debates that will shape the 2008 presidential election.